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Quatenus and Spinoza’s Monism
A L E X A N D E R  D O U G L A S *
abstract  I examine Spinoza’s use of the term quatenus. It is, I argue, an operator 
working in the context of a broader logical theory and blocking certain inferences 
that, according to critics such as Pierre Bayle, lead Spinoza’s metaphysical system into 
absurdities. I reconstruct this crucial theory from some treatises on logic to which 
Spinoza had access. I then show how a later logical theory—that of the Port-Royal 
Logic—does not permit Bayle’s troublesome inferences to be blocked by the use 
of terms like quatenus. Most likely, Bayle was thinking in terms of the later theory, 
Spinoza in terms of the earlier.
keywords Spinoza, quatenus, Pierre Bayle, monism, restriction
1 .  t h e  l o g i c a l  c r i t i q u e  o f  s p i n o z i s m
spinoza holds that god is the only substance and that ordinary things are 
modes of that substance. Precisely what this entails as a metaphysical thesis is a 
matter of contention, but it has been criticized on logical grounds. Briefly, the 
criticism is as follows. Assuming that only a substance can be a proper subject of 
predication, it follows from Spinoza’s thesis that all predications correctly made 
of ordinary things must be properly made of God.1 This leads to contradiction. 
As some read him, Spinoza’s way out is to propose that various claims are true of 
God, not simpliciter, but only “insofar as” (quatenus) he is something specific.2 It 
is then assumed that what holds of God insofar as he is A need not hold of God 
simpliciter, nor of God insofar as he is B where A≠B.
Although many Spinoza scholars have accepted this reply, it is not obvious how 
it resolves the difficulty. What does ‘insofar as’ mean in this context? We need to 
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1 An alternative possibility that I do not discuss is that no predications are correctly made of ordinary 
things: all the claims we make about ourselves and the objects around us are strictly false or perhaps 
meaningless. This moves us in the direction of the ‘acosmist’ reading of Spinoza. Recent discussions 
of this reading can be found in Samuel Newlands, “Thinking, Conceiving, and Idealism in Spinoza”; 
Newlands, “Hegel’s Idealist Reading of Spinoza,” 100–108; Yitzhak Melamed, “Why Spinoza Is Not 
an Eleatic Monist”; Melamed, “Acosmism or Weak Individuals?”; Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, ch. 
2; and Eckart Förster and Melamed, eds., Spinoza and German Idealism.
2 I discuss two replies on Spinoza’s behalf that go along these lines below; they are found in John 
Carriero, “Mode and Substance”; and Melamed, “Metaphysics of Substance.”
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offer some explanation of why saying this saves Spinoza from self-contradiction, 
and that requires us to situate ‘insofar as’ expressions in the context of a broader 
logical-semantic theory. I shall present some historical evidence that Spinoza had 
the resources to articulate such a theory. I will also point out that rescuing Spinoza 
from contradiction requires the rejection of an alternative logical theory that was 
prominent in his day.
Spinoza is not known for his contributions to formal logic.3 He declares logic 
to be no part of his main project in the Ethics (E VPref). At one point in the Short 
Treatise on God, Man, and His Wellbeing, however, he shows willingness to engage 
in it. He argues there that we should ignore the principle upheld by “all the 
Logicians,” stipulating that the correct definition for a term must consist of a 
genus and a difference. Instead, he insists, we should follow a “true logic,” which 
says something else entirely about how definitions must work.4 Spinoza has very 
little else to say about logic, at least explicitly.5 But here, at least, is one piece of 
evidence that he was interested in it, and not only in a passive way: he was willing 
to revise accepted logical theories when he believed he could justify doing so. As 
Mogens Laerke writes, “the absence of an explicit Spinozist semantics does not 
prevent us from investigating its implicit presence in his active thought.”6 Working 
out this implicit theory is an obvious help in imagining how Spinoza might respond 
to the logical critique outlined above.
The critique is given a clear and powerful statement in Pierre Bayle’s dictionary 
entry on Spinoza. Bayle calls Spinoza’s main metaphysical thesis “the most 
monstrous hypothesis imaginable, the most absurd, and the most diametrically 
opposed to the most evident notions in our mind.”7 First, Bayle points out that by 
allowing only one substance into his ontology, Spinoza provides himself with only 
one logical subject for all true predications. Bayle proposes “as an incontestable 
maxim, that all the terms we apply to a subject to signify what it does or what it 
suffers, apply properly and physically to substance and not to its accidents.”8 One 
can contest this maxim, but Bayle thought it was uncontested by anybody in his 
own era, and there is some evidence that Spinoza endorsed it (noted below).9 
It follows that any true predication must be made of Spinoza’s one substance. 
3 ‘Formal logic’ is difficult to define accurately. I mean it in roughly the same sense as Józef 
Bochen´ski uses it, namely, the discipline that is historically and conceptually continuous with Aristotle’s 
logical investigations. For his explanation, see Bochen´ski, A History of Formal Logic, §1, 2–4. 
4 KV I.7. The abbreviation “KV” here refers to the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being. 
References refer to Part and Chapter. 
5 Logic clearly played a role in Spinoza’s theory of knowledge, as argued in Aaron V. Garrett, Mean-
ing in Spinoza’s Method. However, I do not believe there to be a clear logical theory directly expressed 
anywhere in Spinoza’s extant writings. 
6 Laerke, “Deus quatenus,” 261, my translation.
7 Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire, 3.259.
8 Bayle, Dictionnaire, 3.261.
9 It is true that the Ethics is full of passages in which Spinoza seems to assert that predications 
are made of modes. If his “modes” are what Bayle calls “accidents,” this might suggest that he rejects 
Bayle’s theory of predication. But it might not: Bayle’s argument is not that we cannot make predica-
tions of the accidents of a substance but only that, if we were to speak properly in such cases, we would 
make the predications of the substance itself. For instance, ‘Helen’s beauty launched a thousand 
ships’ is acceptable, but would be properly rendered, on Bayle’s theory, as ‘Helen, by being beautiful, 
launched a thousand ships.’
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As Jonathan Bennett puts it, “If your ontology says that there is only one thing, 
then . . . there is no difference between ‘The thing is F’ and ‘Something is F’ and 
‘Everything is F.’”10
This singular subject of predication is the key ingredient in Bayle’s logical recipe 
for drawing monstrosities out of Spinoza’s thesis. If Judas is treacherous, then God 
is treacherous. But if Peter is not treacherous, then God is not treacherous. The 
result is impossible. As Bayle puts it, “If there is anything certain and incontestable 
in human knowledge, it is this Proposition: . . . one cannot affirm two opposing 
terms of the same subject, in the same respect, and at the same time.”11 Yet in 
using the qualifier “in the same respect,” Bayle seems to point the way out of the 
difficulty he raises. Could we not reply on Spinoza’s behalf that although God is 
both treacherous and not treacherous, he is so in different respects, and so there is 
no violation of Bayle’s incontestable principle?
2 .  r e s p e c t s  a n a l y s i s
John Carriero takes up this option.12 He focuses on Spinoza’s use of the word 
quatenus. This term, as Carriero reads it, functions to introduce various respects 
in which contrasting predicates can hold of God without yielding contradiction. 
Thus, for instance, Spinoza claims that God possesses certain properties, not insofar 
as (quatenus) he is infinite, but rather insofar as he constitutes the essence of the 
human mind. Carriero explains:
it seems to me that Spinoza often uses the Latin quatenus to mark out these different 
“ways” or “respects,” as when, for example, he writes that . . . “God, not insofar as 
[quatenus] he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the 
human Mind, or insofar as [quatenus] he constitutes the essence of human Mind” 
has a certain idea (E IIP11C).13
Carriero claims that this distinction, which Spinoza makes several times in the 
Ethics,14 solves the logical problems Bayle raises. Carriero is far from alone in 
proposing this potential way out for Spinoza. In his 1888 book on Spinoza, John 
Caird supposes that “Every reader of Spinoza knows what an important rôle is 
assigned to this quatenus,” by which Spinoza “contrives to escape from difficulties 
and inconsistencies otherwise insuperable.”15
Does Spinoza’s use of quatenus expressions solve problems like the Judas and 
Peter problem mentioned above? This depends in part on whether essentiam 
humanae mentis constituit means, for Spinoza, ‘constitutes the essence of the human 
mind’ or ‘constitutes the essence of a human mind.’ If there is only one essence for 
both Judas’s and Peter’s minds, then God, insofar as he constitutes that essence, 
both has and does not have a certain treacherous idea. Contradiction remains. 
10 Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, 96.
11 Bayle, Dictionnaire, 3.260.
12 Carriero, “Mode and Substance,” 263.
13 Carriero, “Mode and Substance,” 263.
14 E.g. E IIP30D, IIP28D, IIP40D, VP36. 
15 Caird, Spinoza, 166. However, Caird denies that Spinoza’s contrivance is entirely successful.
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However, if there is one essence for Judas’s mind and another for Peter’s mind, 
then we can suppose that God has the treacherous idea insofar as he constitutes 
the essence of Judas’s mind and does not have it insofar as he constitutes the 
essence of Peter’s mind. Then perhaps we have resolved the contradiction, if we can 
suppose it coherent to say that what God does quatenus he constitutes the essence 
of one mind is logically independent of what he does quatenus he constitutes the 
essence of another.16 However, we need to know more about why there is this 
logical independence. I do not find it sufficiently luminous to say simply that such 
phrases express distinct ‘respects’ in which God does something and yet does not 
do it. Yitzhak Melamed proposes that “Spinoza developed this respects-analysis 
into a genuine art.”17 But what is this art, and what is the logical theory behind it?
Carriero and Melamed both imply that a proper appreciation of Spinoza’s use 
of quatenus shows that Bayle’s inferences to absurdity are instances of the fallacy 
of secundum quid ad simpliciter. Aristotle discusses such fallacies in the Sophistical 
Refutations and On Interpretation.18 Some versions of the fallacy are not obviously 
relevant to Spinoza, for instance, the version where ‘S is’ is wrongly inferred from 
‘S is P’ or versions involving ‘alienating’ adjectives (to be discussed below). But 
one version is clearly relevant. As Allan Bäck explains it,
a simple declarative statement of tertium adiacens has its predicate complement 
qualified so as to constitute a complex. Aristotle . . . worries about which cases it is 
legitimate to make the inference to a predication of only a part of that complex. 
E.g., “an Ethiopian is white with respect to his teeth” does not imply “an Ethiopian 
is white,” whereas “an Ethiopian is white with respect to his skin” does.19
Here we have a case where ‘S in respect R is P’ does not always entail ‘S is P.’ But, 
as Bäck goes on to point out, Aristotle does not offer general rules for deciding 
when an inference secundum quid ad simpliciter is false and when it is true. Rather, 
“he gives only the general advice to look at the contradictory of the conclusion, 
to see if it be compatible with the premises.”20 
Later thinkers who build on Aristotle’s discussion suggest that the consequences 
in question are material rather than formal.21 The explanation of this distinction 
by Albert of Saxony is particularly apposite:
16 It is not entirely clear whether Spinoza believed there to be one essence of the human mind or 
one essence for each human mind. With respect to essence of persons, according to Alan Donagan, 
“Nothing but confusion can result from interpreting Spinoza according to the Aristotelian-Scholastic 
notion that, for example, Socrates and Plato are individuated by their matter, and share a common 
essence, humanity” (“Spinoza’s Proof of Immortality,” 250.) On this issue, see Christopher P. Martin, 
“Framework of Essences.”
17 Melamed, “Metaphysics of Substance,” 50.
18 Sophistical Refutations V, 166b37–167a21; and On Interpretation XI, 20b31. There is a growing 
body of literature on secundum quid ad simplicter inferences (though not named as such) in the modern 
context. One exemplary piece is Donald Baxter, “The Discernibility of Identicals.”
19 Bäck, Aristotle’s Theory of Predication, 261.
20 Bäck, Aristotle’s Theory of Predication, 261.
21 On this distinction, see Bochen´ski, A History of Formal Logic, §30; E. J. Ashworth, Language and 
Logic in the Post-Medieval Period, ch. 2.1; Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories, 
pt. 3; and Bäck, On Reduplication, 243 and continuing.
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Of consequences, one kind is formal, another material. That is said to be a formal 
consequence to which every proposition which, if it were to be formed, would be a 
valid consequence, is similar in form, e.g. “b is a, therefore some a is b.” But a material 
consequence is one such that not every proposition similar in form to it is a valid 
consequence, or, as is commonly said, which does not hold in all terms when the form 
is kept the same; e.g. “a man runs, therefore an animal runs.” But in these (other) 
terms the consequence is not valid: “a man runs, therefore a log runs.”22
Aristotle’s refusal to provide formal rules for deciding cases of secundum quid ad 
simpliciter was generally taken to imply that such inferences, if they hold, hold 
materially rather than formally.23 In some cases, ‘S in respect R is P’ does not 
imply ‘S is P.’ In other cases, there is such an implication, but by material rather 
than formal consequence. 
Bayle’s reduction of Spinoza’s theory to absurdity requires secundum quid ad 
simpliciter inferences. Since he offers no justification for those inferences besides 
Spinoza’s statements and a few basic rules of logic, he must regard such inferences 
as formally valid. Thus, he rejects the Aristotelian view as I have interpreted it. On 
what basis does he do so? And what basis did Spinoza have for, on the contrary, 
retaining the Aristotelian view?
Before turning to these questions, we should note one further problem for 
Spinoza. In the passage to which Carriero refers, Spinoza draws a distinction 
between God insofar as he is infinite and God insofar as he is explained through 
the nature of the human mind. Since the human mind is finite, and since 
Spinoza cannot have believed that something infinite could be explained through 
something finite, the upshot of his claim seems to be that God is something insofar 
as he is infinite and something contrary insofar as he is finite. But how does this 
resolve the contradiction? If I say that a number is both even and odd, and then 
clarify the point by saying that it is even insofar as it is composite, and odd insofar 
as it is prime, I appear to have created a second contradiction rather than resolving 
the first one. Invoking respects to resolve a contradiction does not appear to help 
if the respects are themselves contradictory; it only pushes the problem back. 
3 .  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  q u a t e n u s
To understand how Spinoza’s quatenus clauses can work to block Bayle’s secundum 
quid ad simpliciter inferences, we must examine how quatenus functions logically 
for him. Spinoza gives no analysis of the term, and the natural reading of it gives 
us little help in making sense of his claims. It seems to be a quirk of Spinoza 
scholarship that quatenus has so often been translated ‘insofar as’ in English, en tant 
que in French, sofern in German, and so on. The French-Spanish-Latin dictionary 
Spinoza owned does not contain an entry for quatenus,24 but another dictionary, 
22 Albert of Saxony, Perutilis Logica, 4.1.24ra–b. Translated by Bochen´ski, A History of Formal Logic, 
30.14.
23 See Bäck, On Reduplication, §3.1, §5.5, §7, §15.1, and §17.1B.
24 Or, more properly, it does not contain an entry for any French term translated as quatenus—the 
dictionary entries are in French. Heinrich Hornkens, Recueil de Dictionnaires. My information on Spi-
noza’s library comes from Jacob Freudenthal, Die Lebensgeschichte Spinoza’s in Quellenschriften, 160–64.
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not in Spinoza’s library but typical of the period, translates it by the Dutch hoe 
vele (hoeveel). It then gives the examples: videndum est quatenus amicitiae tribuendum 
sit, translated to Men moet zien hoe vele mender vrientschappen toe laten moet; quatenus 
fas erit, translated as soo verre her gheoorloft sal sijn; and quatenus negatur nobis diu 
vivere, translated as om dat het ons niet ghegunnet en wordt langhe te leuen.25 In these 
examples, quatenus is used to mean, respectively, ‘how far,’ ‘to the extent that,’ 
and ‘because’—not ‘insofar as.’
Taking quatenus to mean ‘how far’ or ‘to the extent that,’ we must read Spinoza’s 
statements that God, quatenus infinitus est, does not φ to mean that God does not 
φ to the extent that he is infinite. However, Spinoza tells us in Ethics Idef6 that God 
is infinite “absolutely.” It follows that God absolutely does not φ, which would seem 
to imply that there is no extent to which he φs. This, however, cannot be what 
Spinoza means in the passage cited by Carriero. For that passage clearly implies 
that God, in having an idea insofar as he constitutes the essence of a finite mind, 
has the idea to some extent. Yet if we take quatenus to mean ‘because,’ then we 
have Spinoza claiming that God is P because he is infinite and is not P because he is 
explained through the essence of a human mind, in which case we still have the 
contradictory claim that God is both P and not P. To have any hope of making 
sense of Spinoza, then, we should ignore these dictionary definitions and look for 
ways in which we can interpret quatenus as a logical term of art. 
In a textbook Spinoza owned, by the Leiden logician, Franco Burgersdijck, 
there is a very brief explanation of quatenus as a logical term.26 It appears in a 
discussion of what Burgersdijck calls “restrictive enunciations,” of which he gives 
the example: “Man feels, quatenus he is an animal.”27 In this example, quatenus can 
again be taken to mean ‘because.’ But Burgersdijck goes on to say that in a syllogism 
such enunciations, called ‘exponibles’ by the Scholastics, should be rewritten into 
clearer forms. Supposing that Spinoza took quatenus in this textbook sense gives 
some impetus to Mogens Laerke’s analysis, to which we now turn.
Laerke, noting that Spinoza uses quatenus at least 444 times in the Ethics (in 
addition to many uses of neighboring expressions such as eo ipso and eatenus), 
calls it “a conjunction, which we call a ‘reduplicative particle’ after the Summa 
Logicae of Ockham.”28 He refers to a chapter in which Ockham discusses the 
expression in quantum.29 Ockham distinguishes various ways in which in quantum 
and related reduplicative particles can be used.30 Such particles signal the hidden 
presence of propositions that lie implicit in complex propositions. Ockham calls 
these hidden propositions the “exponents” of the complex propositions. Thus, 
a proposition of the form ‘S in quantum it is R is P’ implicitly contains a pair of 
25 Johannes Servilius, Dictionarium triglotton. Spelling as in original.
26 On Burgersdijck and his influence on Spinoza, see Wiep van Bunge et al., eds., The Bloomsbury 
Companion to Spinoza; Freudenthal, “Spinoza Und Die Scholastik”; and Adolf Trendelburg, Historische 
Beiträge Zur Philosophie, 317–25.
27 Burgersdijck, Institutionum Logicarum, 1.28.5.1.
28 Laerke, “Deus quatenus”, 261, my translation.
29 Guillelmi de Ockham, Summa Logicae, 2.16. See William Ockham, Theory of Propositions, 125–31, 
for an English translation.
30 Ockham, Summa Logicae, 2.16.
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propositions: ‘S is R’ and ‘S is P.’ The different uses of the reduplicative particle 
concern which other exponents are contained. In some reduplicative uses, called 
‘expressions of concomitance,’ a further exponent is ‘everything R is P.’ In others, 
called ‘expressions of cause,’ there is another exponent again: ‘everything R is P 
because it is R.’ However, in all of these uses, one exponent will be ‘S is P.’ Thus, 
the secundum quid ad simpliciter inference from ‘S in quantum it is R is P’ to ‘S is 
P’ is formally valid.
Ockham also identifies an alternative use of such particles—the “specificative.”31 
His discussion of this use is difficult to understand, but through a careful reading, 
Bäck draws from it the rule that: 
An S is P in quantum M (specificative) if and only if
an S is P, and that S is M, and the M that is S is P,
and being M is primary for being P (more so than being S is).32
This bi-conditional also allows us to make the secundum quid ad simpliciter inference 
formally.33 
Thus, we cannot rescue Spinoza from contradiction if, following Laerke’s 
suggestion, we take quatenus to function as a reduplicative particle akin to Ockham’s 
in quantum. Ockham had his own strategies for avoiding secundum quid ad simpliciter 
inferences, but these appear in a different part of the Summa, seem distant from 
Spinoza’s way of thinking, and do not help to make any sense out of his use of 
quatenus.34
Another possibility is to interpret quatenus not as an Ockhamite reduplicative, 
but rather as an expression that involves what some logicians called ‘restrictive 
enunciation.’ This was of particular interest to logicians closer to Spinoza’s time.35 
Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf explains it as follows:
A reduplicative restricted enunciation is one whose subject or predicate is limited 
either by genus or part or accident. Thus, “Man as [quatenus] animal, senses.” The 
subject of this enunciation is limited by genus. “Man as [quoad] soul is immortal.” 
[The subject of] this enunciation is limited or restricted by part. “Christ as [quatenus] 
Mediator is less than the Father, indeed than himself”; “Fire qua hot not qua dry is 
warming”; “Wine as long as [quatenus] consumed in moderation, conduces to health”: 
These enunciations are limited or restricted by their accidents.36
31 Ockham, Summa Logicae, 2.16.
32 Bäck, On Reduplication, 233.
33 John Buridan, by contrast, denies that secundum quid ad simpliciter inferences hold for specificative 
expressions, which he regards as cases of “improper” reduplication (Buridan, Tractatus de Consequentiis, 
4.4.5/Treatise on Consequences, 159). What Buridan and his commentators have to say about secundum 
quid ad simpliciter inferences seems in line with what Polanus and Jungius, discussed below, have to say. 
See Bäck, On Reduplication, 204–5.
34 Ockham, Summa Logicae, 3.4.13; and Bäck, On Reduplication, 189–204. 
35 Bäck, On Reduplication, 357; and Ashworth, Language and Logic, 80.
36 “Enunciatio redpulicativa restringens, est cujus subjectum vel praedicatum limitatur genere 
vel parte vel accidente aliquo: ut, Homo quatenus animal, sentit: Haec enunciatio est limitata genere 
subjecti. Homo quoad animam est immortalis: Haec enunciatio limitata seu restricta est parte. Christus 
quatenus Mediator est minor Patre, imo & seipso. Ignis qua calidus non qua siccus, calefacit. Vinum quatenus 
moderate sumitur, prodest ad confirmandam valetudinem: Haec enunciationes sunt limitatae seu restrictae 
accidente” (Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf, Syntagma Logicum, 285). 
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This seems to imply that by adding a restriction to a subject-term, one can form a 
new subject-term whose suppositum is something somehow less than the suppositum 
of the original subject (this does not necessarily mean that the new suppositum is a 
part of the first—more on this below). This implication is made explicit by Joachim 
Jungius, whose account is otherwise close to that of Polanus:
Reduplication either repeats the prior subject or puts forth a name different from it. The 
first is called reduplicative, the latter specificative by barbaric philosophers. Others 
more elegantly call the one uniform or one-named or similar, and the other biform, 
double-named, or dissimilar.37
Thus, in applying a specificative to a name, one produces a new name, distinct 
from the first, to which the predicate can apply. 
This ‘double-name’ type of enunciation is enough to block formal inferences 
secundum quid ad simpliciter. If the predicate ‘P’ is attached to ‘S,’ with the latter 
functioning as one name, while the predicate ‘not P’ is attached to ‘S quatenus R,’ 
with the latter functioning as another name, then there is no formal compulsion 
to apply both predicates to ‘S.’ Whether such an inference can be materially made 
will depend on whether the supposita of the two names are identical. Now, finally, 
we have the grounds for a reply to Bayle: Spinoza can predicate P of God and 
not-P of God-quatenus-he-is-R without formal contradiction, since there is no formal 
contradiction in predicating contrary things of two distinct subjects. To get to a 
contradiction, Bayle must make a material inference secundum quid ad simplicter. This 
requires justification he does not provide; for instance, to show that the supposita 
of the two names, ‘God’ and ‘God quatenus he is R,’ are identical.38
In what follows, I shall develop this line of reply on Spinoza’s behalf by outlining 
the logical theory it requires. I shall also suggest how Spinoza could have come 
to the required logical theory by consulting the work of Burgersdijck, Polanus, 
Junguis, and the like. I will then show how a different logical theory from a work far 
more prominent in Bayle’s milieu—the Port-Royal Logic—threatens to undermine 
this line of reply. Other works accessible to Spinoza, however, contain sufficient 
material for a counterattack against the Port-Royal Logic.
4 .  b u r g e r s d i j c k  a n d  t h e  p o r t - r o y a l  l o g i c
Spinoza’s way into the required logical theory might have been through the notion 
of participium, presented by Burgersdijck. Burgersdijck gives the following case in 
his metaphysics textbook: “Air that is humid is hot.” Here, he explains, ‘is hot’ is 
37 Jungius, Logica Hamburgensis, 11.38, emphasis added. Translation from Bäck, On Reduplication, 
365.
38 One might object that Bayle does provide such justification: on the assumption that only 
substance can be the true subject of predication, and from Spinoza’s assertion that there is only one 
substance, we can conclude that any name serving as the subject of any true predication must have 
the one substance as its suppositum. However, the matter is not so simple. What Bayle precisely claims 
is that substances rather than accidents are the proper subjects of predication. But if Spinoza allows into 
his ontology entities that are neither substances in the strictest sense, nor accidents in Bayle’s sense, 
then these are not debarred from being the supposita of subjects of proper predication. I briefly explore 
this metaphysical possibility below.
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predicated not simply of ‘air,’ nor of ‘humidity,’ but rather of ‘humid air.’39 The 
metaphysical status of ‘humid air’ is not entirely clear, but the logical status of 
‘humid air’ would seem to be that of what, in his logic textbook, Burgersdijck calls 
a participium. Participia, Burgersdijck argues, are neither logical names, nor logical 
verbs.40 They are not logical names, since they can be tensed (for example, we can 
have ‘air that was humid,’ ‘air that will be humid’), while standard Aristotelian 
doctrine holds that names, unlike verbs, cannot be tensed. Yet participia are not 
verbs either, since it is another standard Aristotelian doctrine that verbs can be 
combined with names to make true or false pronouncements.41 ‘Air that is humid’ 
cannot be used in that way (‘water,’ for instance, is a logical name, and ‘water air 
that is humid’ is nonsense). However, Burgersdijck goes on to say, in a complete 
enunciation a participium plays the role of a name, not that of a verb.42 Perhaps, 
then, terms of the form ‘S quatenus R’ are participia in Spinoza’s implicit logic.
Burgersdijck has little to say on the logical function of participia. But, unlike in 
his discussion of restrictive enunciations,43 he does not claim that, in syllogisms, 
enunciations involving participia should be rewritten by drawing out exponents. 
Thus, even if he treats restrictive enunciations in an Ockhamite fashion, his theory 
allows for another sort of logical term that can be treated more in the fashion in 
which Jungius treats specificative or double-name expressions. Spinoza certainly 
read Burgersdijck, and it is plausible that he knew the works of Polanus and Jungius. 
Thus, he had access to a theory according to which quatenus could function to 
create a new name—a new logical subject—from another name, in a way that does 
not formally license secundum quid ad simpliciter inferences from predications of 
one name to predications of the other name.
By contrast, the Port-Royal Logic, which Spinoza also owned, suggests a different 
way of handling such enunciations. It contains a theory of relative pronouns.44 
It is possible to treat quatenus expressions as relative pronouns, though the Port-
Royal Logic focuses on French expressions using qui, lequel etc. One can read the 
Port-Royal Logic theory here as aiming to explain the same class of expressions 
that earlier logicians had identified as reduplicative, specificative, and restrictive 
enunciations.
The Port-Royal Logic divides uses of relative pronouns into two sorts: the 
“explicative” and the “determinative.”45 An example of an explicative in the Port-
Royal Logic is, “Men, who have been created to know and love God.”46 Although 
39 “calor non est in humiditate ut in subjecto, sed in aqua humida” (Burgersdijck, Institutionum 
Metaphysicarum, 2.17.20). Citations refer to Book, Chapter, and Section.
40 “Participium, etsi per se neque nomen sit; quia adsignificat tempus; neque verbum, quia additum 
nomini, non facit orationem veram aut falsam: in enuntiatione tamen fungitur officio nominis, non 
verbi” (Burgersdijck, Institutionum Logicarum, 1.24.11.6).
41 Burgersdijck, Institutionum Logicarum, 1.24.11.6.
42 Burgersdijck, Institutionum Logicarum, 1.24.11.6.
43 Burgersdijck, Institutionum Logicarum, 1.28.5.1.
44 Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logique, 2.7.
45 Arnauld and Nicole, Logique, 2.7, 117.
46 The quantity of the sample proposition is not relevant to the point being made. Another example 
given is a singular proposition: “Alexander, who was the son of Philip, defeated the Persians” (Arnauld 
and Nicole, Logique, 2.7, 117).
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this is not a complete proposition, it is held to express what is called an ‘incidental 
proposition,’ whose subject is simply ‘men’; this would be ‘Men have been created 
to know and love God.’ The total proposition, for example, “Men, who have been 
created to know and love God, should also love one another,” is thus really a 
conjunction of two propositions with ‘men’ as the subject. Incidental propositions 
are thus akin to ‘exponents’ in earlier logical theories. Treating quatenus as an 
explicative relative pronoun formally licenses, by the drawing out of an exponent, 
the inference from ‘S quatenus R is P’ to ‘S is P.’
The Port-Royal Grammar, diverging slightly from the Port-Royal Logic on this 
point, claims that a relative pronoun introduces an incidental proposition that 
becomes part of the subject or predicate of the main proposition.47 This sounds 
more promising in terms of avoiding secundum quid ad simpliciter inferences. ‘God, 
who is R1, is P’ might then avoid contradiction with ‘God is not P,’ or with ‘God, 
who is R2, is not P,’ since the logical subject of ‘is P’ would then be distinct from 
that of ‘is not P.’ One subject would include the incidental proposition ‘God is 
R1’ while the other would not. Unfortunately, the presentation in the Port-Royal 
Grammar is somewhat confused. The example given, slightly modified, is: “God, 
who is invisible, created the world.”48 It is suggested that the incidental proposition 
is the subject of the main proposition. But the main proposition is then construed 
as ‘God created the world,’ which appears to have simply ‘God’ as a subject and no 
sign of the incidental proposition. There is not enough material in the Port-Royal 
Grammar to develop a proper semantic theory of relative pronouns, although 
there is a promising start of something that could help Spinoza.
Returning to the Port-Royal Logic, the other type of relative pronoun is the 
‘determinative.’ Unlike the explicative, a determinative pronoun in an expression 
of the form ‘S, who is R’ does not introduce the incidental proposition ‘S is R.’ 
Thus, for instance, the proposition, ‘Men who are pious are charitable,’ does not 
contain the incidental proposition, ‘Men are pious,’ since ‘who are pious’ is a 
determinative rather than an explicative expression.49 In asserting this proposition, 
“the spirit joins together the idea ‘pious’ with that of ‘men,’ and having thus made 
a total idea, judges that the attribute ‘charitable’ applies to this total idea.”50 The 
pronominal phrase then seems to produce a new logical subject. This looks similar 
to the theory of double-names and thus appears promising for Spinoza.
It turns out, however, that while determinatives do not imply the same incidental 
propositions that explicatives do, they do imply incidental propositions of another 
sort. In the incidental proposition introduced by a determinative, “the attribute 
is not predicated of the subject to which the ‘who’ relates.”51 Nevertheless, there 
is an incidental proposition in which a different attribute is predicated of that 
47 Arnauld and Claude Lancelot, Port-Royal Grammar, ch. 9.
48 Arnauld and Claude Lancelot, Port-Royal Grammar, 99.
49 Here the quantity might matter; the Port-Royal Logic gives no examples of determinatives ap-
plied to singular subjects. But in the explanation of determinatives given below, we will see that there 
is no reason in principle why determinatives cannot be applied to singular subjects.
50 Arnauld and Nicole, Logique, 2.6, 114.
51 “l’attribut de la proposition incidente n’y est pas affirmé du sujet auquel le qui se rapporte” 
(Arnauld and Nicole, Logique, 2.7, 118). 
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subject. What sort of attribute that is is made clear by an example: “Judges who 
are honest deserve praise.”52 Here “it is not being said that there is any judge on 
Earth who possesses this perfection,” namely, honesty. Yet there is nevertheless 
an implicit incidental proposition to the effect that it is possible for some judge to 
possess this perfection.53 Thus, phrases like ‘spirits that are square’ and ‘spirits that 
are round,’ in which ‘that’ functions as a determinative, are said to express false 
incidental propositions. Given this, ‘judges who are honest deserve praise’ should 
be analyzed as something like: ‘It is possible that judges are honest, and if they 
are then they deserve praise.’ To say that judges who are honest deserve praise is 
to say of judges that they can deserve praise by at least one means: being honest.
The Port-Royal analysis of relative pronouns therefore always licenses formal 
secundum quid ad simpliciter inferences of one sort or another, and both sorts would 
be enough to validate Bayle’s critique of Spinoza. If we subject ‘God quatenus he 
constitutes Judas’s mind is treacherous’ to the Port-Royal analysis, then we get 
an incidental proposition either to the effect that God is treacherous or to the 
effect that God could constitute Judas’s mind, and if so, God is treacherous. In 
the first case, we have everything we need to generate Bayle’s absurdities. In the 
second case, we must ask, ‘does God constitute Judas’s mind?’ If so, we again reach 
Baylean conclusions. If not, we have failed to say that anything at all is treacherous, 
which surely cannot be Spinoza’s intention in using expressions of the form ‘God 
quatenus he is R is P.’54
Thus, the Port-Royal Logic is a problem rather than a help for Spinoza. What 
it presents is a way of analyzing away the sort of participia or specificative terms that 
might otherwise block secundum quid ad simpliciter inferences. 
The Port-Royal Logic does have a section discussing what its authors refer to as 
the fallacy of secundum quid ad simpliciter.55 But this turns out to be a different sort 
of fallacy, involving restricted generalization rather than reduplicatives. The first 
example given is the argument: The human body is the most beautiful (body); 
everything that is beautiful must belong to the gods; thus, the gods must have 
human form.56 To this, the authors reply that the human body is beautiful only 
with respect to bodies. The fallacy, then, is to ignore an implicit restriction on the 
generality of ‘most beautiful’: in the first premise, it means only ‘most beautiful 
of bodies,’ whereas the conclusion would require it to mean ‘most beautiful tout 
court.’ The same goes for the second fallacy, taken from Cicero’s On the Nature of 
52 Arnauld and Nicole, Logique, 2.7, 118. I have simplified the example for ease of exposition. The 
original reads: “les juges qui ne font jamais rien par prière et par faveur, sont dignes des louanges”.
53 For some discussion of how possibility and necessity are treated in the Port-Royal Logic, see 
Maria van Der Schaar, “Locke and Arnauld,” 334–35.
54 Or if we do interpret him this way, we have arrived at the ‘acosmist’ reading of Spinoza, accord-
ing to which the existence of finite things, i.e. God quatenus this or that finite mode, is strictly denied. 
In a later work, I hope to argue that one historical explanation for the development of the acosmist 
interpretation is the forgetting of the logical tradition of Polanus and Jungius and the increasing 
dominance of the scheme of the Port-Royal Logic. I provide a list of sources discussing the acosmist 
reading in n. 1 above. 
55 Arnauld and Nicole, Logique, 3.19.5.
56 In that form, the argument does not even appear valid. Presumably, the second premise should 
be ‘everything that is most beautiful must belong to the gods.’
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the Gods, in which it is argued that God cannot possess any of the known virtues, 
since they all imply properties that it makes no sense for God to have (e.g. 
intelligence serves for discovering what is unknown, but nothing is unknown to 
God).57 The fallacy here is “There can be in God no virtues like those of men: thus 
there can be no virtues in God.”58 Again, the implicit restriction on the generality 
of “no virtues” in the premise is ignored to get to the conclusion. In both cases, 
the extension of a subject is taken as wider than it in fact is, because an important 
class-restriction is ignored.
This treatment of secundum quid ad simpliciter has no obvious application to 
Spinoza’s case, nor to the Aristotelian case of the man who is white with respect 
to his teeth. In Spinoza’s case, adding ‘quatenus he is R’ to ‘God’ is not a class-
restriction; ‘God quatenus he is R’ and ‘God’ might denote different entities, but 
it is hard to see how ‘God’ could denote a class of which ‘God quatenus he is R’ 
denotes a proper subclass. God is one thing, not a class of things. Likewise, ‘Socrates 
with respect to his teeth’ does not denote a proper subclass of ‘Socrates.’ Thus, the 
discussion of secundum quid ad simplicter in the Port-Royal Logic is of no relevance 
to Spinoza’s case, nor to some classic Aristotelian cases. Meanwhile, applying its 
analysis of relative pronouns to quatenus clauses could undermine any attempt 
to block Bayle’s secundum quid ad simpliciter inference by the use of such clauses. 
Should Spinoza have been discouraged by this?
5 .  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  p o r t - r o y a l  l o g i c
Spinoza might have found comfort in recognizing that the Port Royal Logic is, 
in any case, deficient. Its analytical apparatus cannot easily handle a variety of 
linguistic phenomena that previous logicians had associated with restriction. These 
are, as Ashworth recounts,
alienation, in which a term is used improperly in an extended or metaphorical sense; 
remotion, where the reference of one term is destroyed by another, as in ‘irrational 
man’; and diminution, where only a part of each object denoted by the subject-term 
is in fact referred to, as in “An Ethiopian is white with respect to his teeth.”59
Here is how Polanus describes alienation:
Alienating determination is the term for an adjective attached to a word in a statement, 
which sweeps away the proper meaning of that word and leads the mind to 
comprehend something else. Thus it is called distracting determination. So where one 
says, “I saw a painted Cicero,” the adjective “painted” is an alienating or distracting 
determination, because it shows that it is not the real Cicero that is to be understood 
but only the one in the picture. Likewise with “This is false gold,” or “A painted dog 
does not bite,” or “A marble lion mauls no-one.”60
57 References to Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods are by Book and Chapter numbers. 
58 Arnauld and Nicole, Logique, 3.19.5, 242, emphasis added.
59 Ashworth, Language and Logic, 92.
60 “Determinato Alienans, est nomen adjectivum alicui voci in enunciatione adjectum, quod prorsus 
evertit propriam vocis illius significationem & ad aliam rem comprehendendam, mentem abducit. 
Vocatur etiam determinatio distrahens: ut si quis dicat, Ego vidi Ciceronem pictum: Hic enim nomen 
adjectivum pictum est determinatio alienans vel distrahens, quae ostendit non esse intelligendum 
Ciceronem verum, sed duntaxat ejus picturam. Sic, Hoc est aurum falsum. Canis pictus non mordet. Leo 
marmoreus neminem discerpit” (Polansdorf, Syntagma Logicvm, 281).
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Since ‘A painted dog does not bite’ is logically equivalent to ‘a dog that is painted 
does not bite,’61 the way to analyze it by the principles of the Port Royal Logic is to 
take ‘that is painted’ as either explicative or determinative. Taking it as explicative 
makes the original statement equivalent to ‘A dog does not bite,’ which is not what 
is meant. Taking it as determinative renders the original statement as ‘A dog can 
be painted, and if it is then it does not bite.’ That sounds strange. Should we say of 
some real dog that it ‘could be painted,’ meaning not that a painting could be made 
of it, nor that paint could be applied to it, but rather that it could itself be paint on 
canvas? This certainly is not what is meant by the original statement, which does not 
aim to convey a thesis about the metaphysical possibility of dogs being paintings.
We can, of course, dismiss the linguistic phenomena of alienating determination 
as mere surface grammar, undertaking to analyze all such statements into a form 
like ‘A painting of a dog does not bite.’ However, the failure of the Port-Royal 
Logic to handle such cases points to a more general deficiency. Spinoza might 
have become aware of this deficiency while reading Johannes Clauberg’s Logica 
Vetus et Nova, another book that he owned. Clauberg proposes that “the subject 
determines how the predicate can be, and contrariwise the predicate determines 
how the subject can be.”62 This explains why: “if it is stated: ‘the dog guards the 
building,’ the predicate does not permit that the subject, the word ‘dog’ [canis], 
can denote the heavenly body. It must denote the animal that barks.”63
Spinoza uses the same analogy himself (drawn perhaps from the Sophistical 
Refutations).64 Perhaps he read Clauberg and realized that there was something 
wrong with the axiom of the Port-Royal Logic, namely, that “the extension of the 
predicate is restricted to that of the subject, so that it denotes nothing more than 
that part of its extension that corresponds to the subject.”65
What the authors of the Port-Royal Logic mean is that any true proposition of 
the form ‘S is P,’ with S as the subject and P as the predicate, could be read as an 
identity statement to the effect that the things denoted by S—what is called S’s 
“extension”—are identical to those denoted by P—P’s “extension.” For the identity 
to hold, as for instance in the case of ‘snow is white,’ the extension of the predicate 
must be implicitly restricted so that ‘white’ does not denote all white things but 
only the white things denoted by ‘snow.’ This theory faces some difficulties, but 
perhaps these can be overcome.66 But in Clauberg’s example the predicate is not 
restricted by the extension of the subject. On the contrary, its application to the 
subject changes the subject’s ordinary extension. Applying ‘guards the building’ 
or ‘is the brightest star in the sky’ to canis produces a different logical subject in 
61 The example is reminiscent of Aristotle’s Categories, 1a2–3.
62 “tale est subjectum, quale permittitur esse a praedicato; & contra, tale est praedicatum, quale 
permittitur esse a subjecto” (Clauberg, Logica, 3.6, 277).
63 “si dicatur, canis est aedium custos, praedicatum non permittit, ut subjectum, canis, signum 
caeleste denotet, sed bestiam latrantem” (Clauberg, Logica, 3.6, 277).
64 E IP17S; Sophistical Refutations IV, 166a16–17.
65 Arnauld and Nicole, Logique, 2.17, 161. 
66 One some of the difficulties, see Peter Geach, Reference and Generality, 52; and Greg Carlson, 
Reference to Kinds in English, 2.3.2, 44–45. Replies to Geach are found in Terence Parsons, “The Doctrine 
of Distribution”, 69; and Dutilh Novaes, Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories, 1.1–3.
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each case. Applying ‘painted’ to ‘dog’ creates a new logical subject—‘painted 
dog’—which is distinct from the subject ‘dog.’
These latter cases, which cannot be easily handled by the principles of the 
Port-Royal Logic, can be easily handled with specificatives (in the Polanus/
Jungius sense) or participia in Burgersdijck’s sense. ‘Dog that guards the building’ 
(or ‘quatenus it guards the building’) and ‘dog that is painted’ (or ‘quatenus it is 
painted’) can alike be regarded as expressions that play the logical role of names 
without naming the same object as ‘dog’ on its own. Once we allow that subject-
terms can be modified by predicates, there appears no reason not to allow that 
they can be modified by specificative terms, including quatenus modifiers. Rejecting 
the Port-Royal theory, the logical function of quatenus can then be spelled out 
as follows. The participium, specificative expression, or double-name, ‘S quatenus 
R,’ introduces a logical subject distinct from that named by ‘S.’ What we say of S 
quatenus R we need not say of S, and what we say of S quatenus R1 we need not say 
of S quatenus R2, where R1≠R2. In this way, the logical difficulties Bayle found in 
Spinoza’s theory can be made to disappear: God quatenus he constitutes Judas’s 
mind is treacherous does not imply that God quatenus he constitutes Peter’s mind 
is treacherous, nor that God is treacherous.
This theory can be built from the logical resources of Polanus, Jungius, 
Burgersdijck, and others of the period. Adding ‘quatenus R’ to a S reduplicates the 
subject; that is to say, it creates a new subject-term whose suppositum might be 
different from that of S. But this is not to say that Spinoza simply read his use of 
quatenus off these theories. The examples of Polanus and Burgersdijck, discussed 
above, can all be interpreted with quatenus meaning ‘to the extent that.’ ‘Air 
quatenus humid is hot’ can mean ‘Air is hot to the extent that it is humid’; ‘Man 
quatenus animal senses’ can mean ‘Man senses to the extent that he is animal’; 
‘Wine quatenus consumed in moderation conduces to health’ can mean ‘Wine 
conduces to health to the extent that it is consumed in moderation.’ This means 
that there is no good reason not to subject these propositions to the analysis of the 
Port-Royal Logic, treating the quatenus phrase as determinative: ‘Air can be humid, 
and if so it is hot’ etc. We have seen, however, that there are cases resistant to the 
Port-Royal analysis, such as the one given by Clauberg. Thus, we can return to the 
analysis of Polanus et al., refusing to treat quatenus as equivalent to ‘to the extent 
that,’ and thus preventing propositions involving it from inviting the Port-Royal 
analysis. ‘S quatenus R’ does not mean, ‘S, to the extent that it is R’ or ‘S, because 
is R,’ or anything else implying something like ‘S is P’ as an exponent. Instead, 
Spinoza can take the treatment of quatenus in the pre-Port-Royal discussions of 
restrictive terms as exhausting its logical role. In at least one of its senses, quatenus is 
just a word we apply to a name to form a new name. What it produces is something 
semantically simple, not something that can be analyzed into exponents or 
incidental propositions.
As Martin Lin and Alexandre Matheron argue, each singular thing—each 
subject of ordinary predications—is for Spinoza a Deus-quatenus.67 I have not 
67 Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza, 291; and Lin, “Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Desire,” 
39.
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been concerned here to explain the nature of the ontological relation between 
the substance named ‘Deus’ and the various things named ‘Deus quatenus . . . .’ 
My primary concern has been to point out that Spinoza had logical resources to 
draw upon in using quatenus in this way: to form new names which then supposit 
in propositions for entities not strictly identical to the suppositum of the original 
name. In this way, we can rebut Bayle’s objection that Spinoza’s statements formally 
entail contradictions. Whether ‘God quatenus R1 is P’ entails ‘God is P’ or ‘God 
quatenus R2 is P’ will depend on the material or ontological relations among the 
supposita of ‘God quatenus R1,’ ‘God quatenus R2,’ and ‘God.’ This reduplication 
of names is, I submit, the core of the art into which, as Melamed claims, Spinoza 
elevated “respects analysis.” 68 A few comments on the ontological issues are, 
however, in order.
6 .  O n t o l o g i c a l  I m p l i c a t i o n s
I propose to refer to the supposita of the names formed using quatenus as “qua-
substances,” adapting some terminology from Kit Fine.69 Here is how Fine describes 
the genesis of what he calls a “qua-object”:
Given any object x and description (property) φ possessed by x, we shall suppose 
there is a new object x qua φ or x under the description φ. Thus if x is Socrates and φ the 
property of being a philosopher, then the new object is Socrates qua philosopher; 
while if x is Mrs. Thatcher and φ the property of being a Prime Minister, then the 
new object is Mrs. Thatcher qua Prime Minister.70
Fine appears to hold that ‘x qua φ’ will fail of reference unless x is φ, or falls under 
the description φ, so that if ‘x qua φ’ refers then ‘x is φ’ is true. But this does not 
have to follow; Aristotle’s example, “An Ethiopian qua his teeth is white,” does 
not imply that an Ethiopian is his teeth. To treat predications made of ‘x qua φ’ 
as implying the incidental proposition ‘x is φ’ or anything like this is to revert to 
something like the Port-Royal analysis. On the view I am ascribing to Spinoza—
the view arrived at by taking literally Polanus’s theory of restriction, Jungius’s 
explanation of specificatives, and Burgersdijck’s analysis of participia—‘x qua φ’ 
simply functions as a name. It implies no incidental proposition, not even ‘x is φ.’
Lin suggests that when Spinoza uses terms like “affections” and “modes” he 
means to refer to what I call “qua-substances.”71 In this case, what really exists 
will consist of substance and qua-substances. Meanwhile, the various descriptions 
that go into the quatenus expressions—the ‘R’ in ‘S quatenus R’—will themselves 
name nothing that exists ‘truly in Nature’ or ‘outside the intellect.’ These 
descriptions—accident-terms as distinct from subject-terms—refer only to our 
ways of identifying the various qua-substances (the modes). This somewhat accords 
with the nominalist attitude Spinoza appears to take towards universals, although 
68 Melamed, “Metaphysics of Substance,” 50.
69 Fine, “Acts, Events, and Objects,” 97–105. For a comparison of Fine’s theory with some of those 
discussed here, see Bäck, On Reduplication, 489–93.
70 Fine, “Acts, Events, and Objects,” 100.
71 Lin, Being and Reason, ch. 6.
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I do not wish to place too much weight on this point.72 What is important here is 
that it allows Spinoza to have a range of subjects of predication without violating 
Bayle’s maxim that predications must be properly made of substance rather than 
accidents. Qua-substances, we can reply, are neither substances—at least not in 
the full sense—nor are they accidents. The maxim does not pronounce on the 
possibility of predications being made of qua-substances.
What, however, is the ontological relation between qua-substances and 
substance? One tame proposal is that qua-substances are simply ‘parts’ of substance. 
In this case, ‘God quatenus R’ is a case of what Ashworth refers to as “diminution” 
in the quotation above; it refers to a ‘part’ of God, and a formal inference from 
‘God quatenus R is P’ to ‘God is P’ will amount to a mere fallacy of composition.73 
But Spinoza states quite unambiguously that if substance had parts, they would be, 
per impossibile, finite substances rather than qua-substances: “by ‘part of substance’ 
nothing can be understood besides ‘finite substance,’ which (by IP8) involves a 
manifest contradiction.”74 It could be argued that there is another way of using 
‘part,’ according to which qua-substances can be rightly called parts of substance. 
But it is up to the proponent of this reading to spell it out.75
Another option, in line with some recent trends in analytic metaphysics, is 
to treat qua-substances as non-basic entities, which stand in some relation of 
ontological dependence or groundedness to the one substance.76 Lin takes 
Spinoza’s modes in this way.77 Others might prefer to speak of partial or qualified 
identity.78 A detailed interpretation of Spinoza’s metaphysics requires the nature 
of this relation to be adequately explained. Here I am content to make the point 
that, whatever his metaphysical theory might be, according to Spinoza’s implicit 
logical theory we refer to qua-substances by applying quantenus-modifiers to a name 
for substance. The logical relation between ‘S’ and ‘S quatenus R’ is explicable in 
terms of a theory of name-reduplication; whatever metaphysical relation matches 
this logical relation remains, for my part, an open question.
Finally, we come to the problem of substance seeming to be in contradictory 
respects. This is only a worry if ‘S quatenus R is P’ entails ‘S is R.’ But Spinoza is 
no more committed to allowing this inference than to allowing the secundum 
quid ad simpliciter inference. For him, ‘S quatenus R’ functions simply as a name. 
Unlike in the Port-Royal Logic, ‘S quatenus R is P’ does not contain any incidental 
proposition of the form ‘S is R’ or ‘S could be R’ (nor, unlike other theories, does 
72 E IIP40S1.
73 This is not to say that logicians found it easy to say precisely what made part-to-whole inferences 
materially valid in some cases and not in others. See, e.g. Peter of Spain’s attempts to grapple with the 
puzzle, related in Bäck, On Reduplication, 174–80.
74 E IP13S. Some analysis of Spinoza’s argument can be found in Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 
47–48; Bennett, Study, §20.2; and Carriero, “Monism in Spinoza,” 38–59.
75 Melamed, for instance, declares some agreement with Jonathan Schaffer’s reading of Spinoza’s 
monism, which involves reference to parts, but contends that “Schaffer is using ‘part’ in a sense sig-
nificantly different from Spinoza’s” (Melamed, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, 48n146).
76 See, e.g. Schaffer, “On What Grounds What.”
77 Lin, Being and Reason, ch. 6.
78 See Baxter, “The Discernibility of Identicals.”
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it generate any incidental proposition of the form ‘R is P’).79 Thus, the problem of 
contradictory respects does not arise for Spinoza, so long as he limits the function 
of ‘quatenus R’ to restricting the subject S and yielding a new name.
7 .  c o n c l u s i o n
Spinoza does not, on this reading, advance at all beyond the traditional solution to 
the problem of secundum quid ad simpliciter, namely, that of treating such inferences 
as material rather than formal. It is clear enough that ‘God quatenus infinite is P’ 
implies ‘God is P,’ whereas ‘God quatenus this finite mind is P’ does not imply ‘God 
is P.’ Thus, the inference in the first case cannot be formal in Albert of Saxony’s 
sense; it does not hold when the premise is replaced by another proposition of the 
same form. The inference is, rather, material; it holds by virtue of the metaphysical 
relations among the things named. It is far beyond my purpose to explain how 
we have knowledge of such metaphysical relations according to Spinoza. What I 
do hope to have shown is that all Spinoza needs to resist Bayle’s logical objections 
is a theory of quatenus expressions that prevents them from being analyzed away 
into incidental propositions having for their subject only the term to which the 
quatenus clause was attached.
Bayle was clearly familiar with the Port-Royal Logic; he refers to it in his 
dictionary.80 I find it likely that in his criticism of Spinoza he had in the back of 
his mind the Port-Royal theory of restrictive terms, which rules secundum quid 
ad simpliciter inferences (except those involving fallacies of class-restriction) to 
be ‘formally’ valid. For Spinoza, by contrast, such consequences will be material 
rather than formal, and the material consequences must be decided at the level of 
metaphysics, not at the level of bare logic. Bayle’s logical criticism does not then 
constitute a good reason for rejecting Spinoza’s metaphysical theory; rather, it is 
only by knowing what is the case metaphysically speaking that we can know whether 
Bayle’s inferences to absurd and contradictory conclusions are valid.
With the Port-Royal analysis out of the way, and adopting the earlier theory 
according to which quatenus operators produce new subject-terms, we can test some 
of Spinoza’s claims for their implications. Take the following passage:
God, not quatenus he is infinite, but quatenus he is explained by the human mind, that 
is, quatenus he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea. And 
when we say that God has this or that idea, not quatenus he constitutes the nature of the 
human mind, but quatenus he has along with the idea of the human mind the idea of 
another thing, then we say that the human mind perceives partially or inadequately.81
To avoid the inference from ‘God quatenus (he constitutes the essence of a) 
human mind has this or that idea’ to ‘God has this or that idea,’ we must treat 
‘God quatenus human mind’ and ‘God’ as naming two distinct supposita. On the 
interpretation proposed by Lin, ‘God quatenus human mind’ will name a human 
mind. But then, ‘God quatenus human mind along with the idea of something 
79 Various theories with that implication are discussed throughout Bäck, On Reduplication.
80 E.g. at note M in the entry “Pascal” (Bayle, Dictionnaire, 2.740).
81 E IIP11C.
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else’ will be the name for a human mind having an inadequate idea. If this names 
a distinct suppositum again from ‘God quatenus human mind,’ then it will follow 
that when a human mind comes to have inadequate ideas, or ceases to do so, a 
new dependent entity comes into being. Is that Spinoza’s metaphysical theory? It 
is implied by some Spinoza interpreters. Curley, for instance, proposes that when 
Spinoza speaks of the eternity of the mind, he “does not mean that I can entertain 
any hope of immortality.”82 The reason is that what is eternal is a mind with no 
inadequate ideas, whereas my mind—the one currently hoping for eternity—is 
riddled with them. The two entities are distinct.
The point of the logical interpretation given here is that questions like these 
are a matter for metaphysical investigation. Whether we can coherently hold that 
‘God quatenus my mind plus the idea of something else is P’ and ‘God quatenus my 
mind on its own is not P’ is a matter of material rather than formal consequence. 
We need to know enough about the supposita of the various names to know which 
inferences are valid; we cannot read this knowledge off the forms in our language. 
In blocking Bayle’s secundum quid ad simpliciter inferences, we also deprive ourselves 
of any way of reading significant formal consequences off Spinoza’s use of the 
quatenus modifier. 
I have tried to think, with an eye to historical context, how Spinoza might 
have conceived of the semantics of quatenus so as to avoid Baylean conclusions. 
Other Spinoza commentators can claim with justice that I have taken the long 
way around to what they have been saying all along: Spinoza avoids the Baylean 
conclusions by making different predications of God in different respects, and 
that God in one respect cannot be strictly identical with God in another respect.83 
This is, anyway, a traditional Aristotelian way of rejecting formal secundum quid ad 
simpliciter inferences. But the Port-Royal Logic gives one example of a theory that 
does not allow that Aristotelian move. I believe it is therefore important for any 
defender of Spinoza to motivate the rejection of the Port-Royal theory and the 
retention of an alternative theory.
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